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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
-oOo-

*

.. :~LIA~ T. BLODGETT and FLORENCE
_:. BLOCGETT, his wife,

*

Plaintiffs and
Appellants,

*

vs.

*

jOE MART SCH' BETTY PURCELL' aka
?E':'TY PURCELL MART SCH, DOYLE NEASE,
'ACO CAR WASH SYSTEMS' INC. a Utah
:orporation, WAYNE A. ASHWORTH,
:rustee, KARL W. TENNEY, VALLEY
3ANK & TRUST COMPANY, a Utah
:anking corporation, FIRST SECURITY
~~K OF IDAHO, NA.A, STATE OF UTAH
a~d JOHN DOES 1 through 10,
Defendants and
Respondents.

Civil No.

15608

*

*
*
*

*
*

*
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

Appellant seeks a reversal of the summary judgment
;canted below against appellants

in favor of the respondents.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On October 20,
:~dgment

1977,

the lower court granted summary

in favor of respondents Joe Martsch, Wayne A.

'arl W. Tenney,

and Valley Bank & Trust Company.

Ashworth,

On November 3,

:;'6, the lower court entered an order denying appellants' motion
·:Orr.end or alter Judgment.
::o"ted summary

judgment

On October

20,

1977,

the lower court

in favor of respondent State of Utah.
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A 11 rem a i n i n g p a r t i e s :

<J

t '": c: a c t i on '"' e re e i t ~1 e r d i s :n i s s e d ·,.; 1 :

prejudice by appellants or
~ease

the case of Doyle

judg~ent

·.: •.

was taken against them.
part1E~

and John Does 1 through 10, the

were never served.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek a finding of error in the lower cc•Jr:':
granting of summary judgment as to the respondents Joe

Martsc~,

Wayne A. Ashworth, Karl W. Tenney, Valley Bank & Trust Company,
and the State of Utah and asks this Court to remand the case ca:<
to the lower court for a trial on the merits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prior to September 21, 1973, appellants were the owner;
in fee title of two contiguous parcels of ground in the South
Salt Lake area near the Van Winkle Expressway.

One parcel r.as

been variously referred to in the pleadings as Parcel 1 or the
car wash property.

Subsequent to November 5, 1971, a car wash

was erected on the said property.

The other piece of property

has been been variously referred to as Parcel 2 or the grocery
store property.

The appellants had operated a grocery store

business on the said parcel for many years.
acquired by appellants at two separate times,

The two parce:s ··"''
the car wash

property being acquired last.
On April 23, 1969, tr.e appellants executed a tr:Jst :.o-::
with respondent Valley Bank
property.
of 530,000.

~

Tr~st

Company covering

:~e

stoce

This was pursuant to a promissory note in tne arc
(Kar: Tenney ~epcsitiJn, Ex.?-6;
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:c-:l3nts entered into a le3se with Raco Car Wash Systems and
Purcell, defendants below, covering the car wash property.
·c

leasees proposed to erect

.'~se,

by its

:i.

car wash on the property.

terms, specified that the car wash property was to

:c S'Jbordinated

to assist the lessees in obtaining financing for

::.e construction of the car wash.
··;t

The lease further provided

no other property belonging to appellants was to be

.:.eluded.
~))

This

(Edgar Throndsen Deposition, page 35, Exs. P-3 and P-

Mr. Throndsen, testifying on behalf of the respondent bank,

:omitted that the terms of the lease with regard to subordination
·.ad been reviewed by the bank prior to the closing of the loan

'.'lr the financing of the car wash construction.

(Throndsen

:e::icsition, pages 51, 52)
The respondent bank proceeded to prepare the loan
:xuments for the financing of the car wash.

All negotiations

•ere accomplished through dealings between the respondent bank
::d officers

and agents of Raco Car Wash.

(Throndsen Deposition,

·:;es 22-33) Appellants had been customers of the respondent bank
':r some period of time and were well known to the bank.

>rondsen Deposition, page 27) Nevertheless, the respondent bank
-=:5e no contact with the Blodgetts regarding the loan prior to

·:c:ifying them of the closing date, at which time the documents
::r the closing of the loan were in final form.

The notification

.: closing came the same afternoon as the closing.
:.:~:;ett

(William

Ceposition, pages 14-15)
On No·;ember 5, 1971, appellants were called to the
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respondent bank for the purpose of executing various documents
the car wash loan. Although there is some controversy about
exactly what happened and what ·..ias said at the closing, the fac·_
must be taken in a light most favorable to the appellants.

In

that regard, appellants were not informed by any of respondent
bank's agents or officials or by defendant Purcell, who was als:
in attendance, that any property other than that described
lease and known

3S

int~,,

o·:

the car wash property was being encumbered

the trust deed and note.

(Affidavit of William T. Blodgett and

Florence G. Blodgett, dated May 17, 1977) They did know, however,
that the lease with Raco Car Wash covered ingress and egress ove:
the store property.

(William Blodgett Deposition, page 29)

the time of the closing, appellant William Blodgett told the

At
ba~<

officer conducting the closing that he did not understand fully
what he was signing and therefore asked for copies of all

documents signed.

Respondent bank failed to provide any copies

except for mailing a copy of the note.
Deposition, page 17)

(William Blodgett

Mrs. Blodgett could not read any of the

documents because of an eye problem.

(Florence Blodgett

Deposition, pages 12-13)
Although the respondents now claim that the trust .:Jee~
signed on November 5, 1971 by appellants includes the store
property as well as the car wash property and that it was

nec~s

sary to have the store property as additioral security for the
loan, the::e is no indication in the loan committee mir1utes o' discussion o~ !ddit1onal secu::~tv requi::ements.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cc~s1cion,

Ex.

"--J~J.ection

P-1~)

Mr. Throndsen himself has no independent

that such was discussed by the com:nittee.

(Throndsen

, _:.s i: ion, pages 29-3 0)
On July 28, 1972, appellants prepaid some $20,000 owing
- t'ie .1'..pril 23, 1969 trust deed and note covering the store
~cJperty.
·~3nce

On September 28,

1973 respondent bank issued a recon-

of the property signed by respondent Tenney, and

:3ncelled the trust deed and note.
:JGes 51-52,
-o~ey

(Karl Tenney Deposition,

54-55 and Exs. P-6 and P-10)

The bank accepted the

which was not due until 1974 without advising appellants

::.at the store property was included as part of the trust deed

:·en in default.
;~ply

~'

(Tenney Deposition, page 65)

Nor did the bank

any of the $20,000 to remedy the car wash loan default.

It

nevertheless claimed by respondent bank that at the time of

:·.e prepayment, the bank fully knew that the trust deed covering
:·.e car ·,yash loan included the store property.

(Tenney

:cposition, page 62)
The note executed on November 5, 1971 became overdue in
;;,ly 1972 and notices to this effect were sent to Betty Purcell
"'::tsch on n·..imerous occasions.
:: the same time,
·:at they wanted

(Tenney Deposition, pages 23-26)

the respondent bank indicated to the Blodgetts
to work with the Blodgetts to make certain that

::.e Slcdgetts did not lose out on their property.

(Throndsen

:•:c:sition, page 56; Donald Sawaya Deposition, pages 18-20, Ex.

T~e

trustee sa:e

~as

noticed uc

~or

September 20, 1973
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at which time respondent Ashworth conducted 3 s3le of that
property allegedl/ covered by the trust deed. Prior to the

sal~

three notices were posted, only one of which was posted in the
precinct where the property was :ocated.
Deposition, pages 7-10, Ex. P-1)

(Russel Weaver

The date, time and place oE :'.'

same was for September, 20, 1973 at 10:00 a.m. and the sale '"'as
to be for cash at the time of the sale.

In fact, the money was

not transferred until September 21, 1973 at about 9:00 a.m.
(Sawaya Deposition, pages 10-11, Ex. F)

No postponement was

given by public declaration as that is set forth in Utah Code
Annotated §57-1-27.
The description of the property of the car wash as
stated in the notice of sale and also as it appeared in the Dall;'
Record as a published notice, describes the property as follows
(after giving the starting point):

"South 89 degrees 15'45" Wes:

71.67 ft; North 0 degrees 20'50" East 0 degrees, 17'45" West 1:4
ft to Beginning."

(Weaver Deposition, Exhibit P-2; Ashworth

Deposition, Exhibit P-3)

The true description of the car wash

property is (after stating the point

of beginning):

"South 69

degrees 15'45" West 71.67 ft; North O degrees 20'50" East 154

ft;

North 89 degrees 15'45" East 71.53 feet; South 0 degrees 17'45"
West 154 ft. to Beginning."

In other words, two courses of the

metes and bounds description were left off and the description·'
the property to be sold was totally unclear, contrary to the
require~e~ts

of Utah Code Annotated §57-1-25.

The purchaser at the sale w3s Betty Purce:l
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~artsc·

3 ::eoring

";:·~sch

either as an ac:rent or a partner of respondent Joe

(Pace Deposition, pages .t-8; Sawaya De;::iosition, pages 7-

Respondent Joe Martsch was the common law husband of Betty
:;rcell '.1artsch and was involved in business dealings with her.
:.: o!Le time he was a di rector of Raco Car Wash Company.
:urcell

~artsch

Deposition, pages 6,

:1d Betty Purcell Martsch 's answers

58-59,

(Betty

70; Raco Car Wash's

to amended complaint)

;Jbsequent to the trustee sale, the car wash property was sold to
:~e

State of Utah for a sum which exceeded the amount paid by

•artsch at the trustee sale.

The details of the sale to the

o'.3te were worked out by Betty Purcell Martsch.

(Betty Purcell

v3rtsch Deposition, pages 82-84)

ARGUMENT

POINT I

THE LOWER COURT DID NOT APPLY THE PROPER STANDARD
FOR DETERMINING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
It is a clear principle in this State that in deciding
<ether to grant a summary judgment, the facts must be taken in a
~:;ht :nost favorable
0::g!;t.

to the party against whom the judgment is

As this Court has said recently, where a motion for

:;r,:rary judgment is granted "the party moved against is being
"''e2::ed wit:iout

.:: :2~'5,1267

the privilege of trial.."

(Ctan 19-6;.

Rich v. ~cGovern,

551

':lence a court s:-icu:d ::e careful to
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make certain that if a plaintiff's contentions and proposals as
to proof of material facts,

if resolved in his favor, would
the motion for summary judgment

entitle him to prevail,.

should be denied and a trial should be had for the pur?ose of
resolving the disputed issues of fact and determining the rights
of the parties." Id. at 1267
In this case, it is clear that the lower court did not
follow the proper rule.

The summary judgment signed by the lowe:

court in favor of respondents Joe Martsch, Wayne Ashworth, Karl
Tenney and Valley Bank & Trust on its face makes statements
completely contrary to the evidence taken in a light most
favorable to the appellants.
For example, the summary judgment states that
respondents made no representations to the plaintiffs that were
false or incorrect.

This is contradicted by numerous statements

made by respondents or their officers in depositions taken in
this case.

As one example, appellants were required to sign the

trust note as co-makers although it was represented to them that
they were signing "on a standby basis".
Deposition, page 38)

(William Blodgett

The officer in charge of the closing

admitted he could see no basis for the appellants to sign the
note at al 1.

(Throndsen Deposition, page 51)

Therefore, with

regard to the note, respondent bank misrepresented two
significant things, namely that the Blodgetts had to sign at aL
and that they were only signing on a "standby" basis,
~act,

~~en

l~

the nc~e on its face shews the a!cdgetts as co-si~~~~~
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-a-

·- ;;ote.

One of the most significant misrepresentations is the
~c'Jsion

in the trust deed signed by the Blodgetts on November

:, 1971 of more property than the car wash property. Respondent
: 3 r.~

alleged that the documents were prepared in accordance with

::,e agreement and understanding of the parties.
:a1k had

The respondent

full knowledge of the contents of the lease between the

:~odgetts

and Raco Car Wash.

That lease specifically provided

::r no other property to be subordinated by the Blod<;etts than
'.:.e car wash property.
:~ocery

The inclusion in the t:-ust deed of the

store property was therefore a misrepresentation that the

~es;:;ondent

bank was handling the matter in accord with the

:s~eement.

Respondent Tenney contacted the appellants on a number
:f occasions and

assured them that respondent bank was willing to

:'.iminate the interest of Betty Purcell and Raco Car Wash on the
:=.r wash property. In fact,

'"s

the bank's only apparent intention

to sell the property at trustee's sale and to get the amount

:'. its note paid out of that sale without any regard to the

::terest of the Blodgetts.

Even as late as August 17, 1973, a

:etter from counsel for respondent Ashworth to counsel for
:~pellants

stated:

"It is the banks

[sic]

intention to pursue

::e matter to the extent of terminating Mrs. Purcell's interest
t~e

above referred to property."

(Sawaya Deposition, Exhibit

Both respondents bank and Tenney on various occasions
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had dealings with the Blodgetts after the trust deed note was

1

default, but at no tirr.e did they tell appellants of any clai:r •bank had to the grocery store property.

If the respondents

Tenney and bank really thought, as they apparently claim now,
that the grocery store property was included in the trust deed,
they misrepresented their dealings with the Blodgetts by making
no reference at all to the grocery store property as being
included in the trust deed or in any way being in jeopardy of
default.
The respondents bank and Tenney accepted a prepayment
covering the entire amount remaining due on the first trust note
on the store property.

The reconveyance was issued a few days

after the trustee sale without any reference to any second trust
deed or obligation. By accepting the money as a prepayment, but
neither applying it towards any default on the note with Raco Co:
Wash nor informing the Blodgetts that the default on the Raco
note affected in any way the store property, the respondents t:ar\
and Tenney withheld infonr.ation from the Blodgetts, constituti"J
a misrepresentation of the facts.
If for no other reason than the misrepresentations
noted above, the summary judgment granted in favor of respondeccc
Tenney and bank should be reversed. However, as wi 11 be discuss,:
below, there are additional reasons why

t~e

summary judgment

should t:e reversed as to all parties.
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'

- - i...-

POINT I I

RESPONDS~T

~ARTSCH

WAS NOT A BONA FIDE PURCHASE FOR VALUE

At no time prior to the trustee sale did respondent
'~rtsch

ever have any personal dealings with respondents bank,

~"~.ney,

Ashworth or State of Utah.

All of his dealings were

:-rough Betty Purcell !'lartsch, the owner and moving force behind
oco Car Wash, which company had caused the default of the trust

-.ote in the first place.
•:t~

Betty Purcell Martsch had had dealings

resIJondent bank in setting up the trust note and deed and

-d dealings with the Blodgetts in arranging for the lease and
:~~ordination

of the car wash property.

Therefore, at the time

:: the trustee's sale, Betty Purcell Martsch, bidding in at the
::·Jstee's sale in the name of Joe Martsch, either knew that the
::_ot deed covered only the car wash property or knew that it was
-:: t'.",e intention nor the understanding of the Blodgetts that the
o:;re property was included in the sale.

°':e,

Immediately after the

Mrs. Martsch made claim to the store property and sent

-:tices to the store property tenants that Joe Martsch was the
'

-~w

,

:::~-=rty

owner.

She also began negotiations to sell part of the

to the State.

(Purcell Deposition, pages 79-83)

As indicated by the above, Joe Martsch was put on notof all of the

i~firmities

in the sale by the activities of

3;ent and wife, Mrs. Martsch.
·

~=ed

eit~er

jid

~ot

Specifically he knew that the

intend co convey the grocery store

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

propertj, or, if it ::lid, t'.'.at i: ·..ias :ir. errcr for it to be

3C•

included and should not ha?e been considered :he subject of t ' '
truste.,.•s sale.
It is further apparent that, contrary to the

state:r.e~.·

made in the order of s•ummary judgment granted by the lower ccur:
on September 24, 1976, respondent Joe Martsch through his agen:
made misrepresentations to appellants.

Therefore, the summary

judgment should be reversed and the matter be allowed to proceec
to trial on its merits.

POINT III

THERE IS EVIDENCE RESPCNDENTS BANK, TENNEY AND ASHWORTH BREACoE'.:
THEIR FIDUCIARY DUTY TO APPELLANTS
Respondents bank, Tenney, and Ashworth, held positior.s
of fiduciary responsibility to the appellants.

Fiduciary duties

were created with respondents bank and Tenney because of the
close relationship they had had with the appellants.

The test-

imony is abundantly clear that appellants maintained a long
banking relationship with the bank and with Mr. Tenney, and tr.a:
appellants trusted the bank and Mr. Tenney completely. Hence,
with regard to the preparation of the original trust deed and
note as well as with regard to the dealings of the bank and

~r.

Tenney in pursuing the defac1lt, the appellants were not pror..~t~;
to make further

inqu:..~y

:i..:-lto

complete reliance upcn :enrey

tb.e ;r;atter ::~ca.use cf
ar~

:re

car~

t: a::

t:.!Je1r
~n

f~~:

::'":

appel:3~:~
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_est interest.

The courts have held that:
Where it is alleged a bank has acted as the
financial advisor of one of its deoositors
for many years and that the latter.has relied
upon such advice, it is a sufficient allegation that a confidential relationship in
regard to financial matters does exist and
that, if it is proved, the bank is subject to
the rules applying to confidential relations
in general.
(The bank] must disclose
fairly and honestly to the client all of the
facts which might be presumed to influence
him in regard to his actions.

o:ew:irt v. Phoenix Nat. Bank, 49 Ariz. 34, 64 P.2d 101 (1937).
; 0

:a

e 3lso Tone v. Halsey Stuart

&

Co., 286 Ill. App. 169, 3 N.E.

142 ( 1 9 3 6 ) •

It should be further noted that the bank had already
e1tered into a trust deed with the Blodgetts prior to the Raco
:2r Wash deal.

The bank was not only the beneficiary but also

::.e trustee of that trust deed.

As such, the bank could not with

.·.,unity further encumber the store property without explicit
~?roval

from the Blodgetts after a full explanation of the same.

' :s ·..ias stated in Holman v. Ryon,

56 F'.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1932):

A trustee named in deed of trust to secure a
loan sustains a fiduciary relationship to the
debtor as well as to the creditor.
F.2d at 310.

The same court in a similar case said further:
The law requires of a trustee in such
circumstances that he act fairly toward both
parties and in the best interest of each and
not for the exclusive benefit of either,
because, after he has acted the right of
redemption is lost.

2:..:::11

v. Ballard,

:~~:~:J::

:--ias

58 F'.2d 517, 519 (D.C. Cir. 1932).

furtho:::r tee:-i e~unciated

t:y otr.er- courts.

This
See,

e.g.,
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Huff~an

;pp.

v. Gould,

64

~.E.2d

773

(1946)

trustee to act "for the bes': interest of all parties.");
Wilson 'J.Haves, 193 S.'ti.2d 107 (Tenn. 1945).
2d

~ort~agPs

See also 35 ,;'1', "-'

§17.

With regard to the Raco Car \'iash loan, the trustees,:;:
was passed to respondent Ashworth shortly before the trustee's
sale.

In that regard Mr. Ashworth had a fiduciary

relationshi~

not only to the bank but also to the Blodgetts, as established
above.
It is clear, therefore, that the respondent bank, one
of its principal officers, respondent Tenney, and the trustee
under the Raco Car

~ash

trust, respondent Ashworth, all had a

confidential relationship with the appellants.

They were under

duty to act in the best interests of not cnly the bank but als:
the Blodgetts.

That they failed to do this is clear from the

facts of the case.
The Blodgetts were never consulted by the bank that a:,
additional property would be required of them for the purposes
the Raco Car

~ash

c:

note other than the car wash property itsel'..

The Blodgetts were not the ones seeking the loan but were tied :
only because of the lease.

The lease specifically said that c:

other property other than the car wash property was to be
dinated.

~evertheless,

pondents now

clai~

s~c:r-

and despite the foregoing, the res-

that they felt entitled to include as

addi':.icnal property, n·ot belong1:-:_, to R2.cc er \'.rs.

-.:.

1"'.ar:::c~,

so,

T~.ey

-

sec~ri:.

~
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::,:

··e 3Jod3etts at the time of the signing of the obligatio:1s or at
t1~e

prior or subsequent thereto.

-.-1eJ ot:ier property at
'J

the time,

~oreover,

the Blodgetts

but they were not consulted as

whether- t'.1ey would prefer- to have such other property f)Ut 'J?

.. additional security,

if any at all.

It is clear that the

,espondents were guilty of the grossest kind of misconduct in
:~priciously

and arbitr-arily dealing with the property of those

:J 't1hom they owed a fiduciary duty without their consent or even
;~,owl

edge.
It should be further noted that as the note continued

:n default and as the time for the trust deed sale neared, the
c~spondent
~'::iper-ty

bank made no effort to inform the Blodgetts that any

other- than the car wash property was in jeopardy.

::=•1ertheless,
~pra1sals

it was clear from the respondent bank's own

that the store property was worth many times over the

:3lue of the car wash property.

Respondents bank and Tenney had

; juty to inform the ap9ellants that it would be foolish to let

::12 property even go to sale.
At the time of the sale Mr. Ashworth had been appointed
'.cJStee . .l>.s discussed above, he had an obligation to act in the
; ==s: interests of both the beneficiary and the debtor.

Under

::.ose circumstances he had a duty to advise the parties that two
::,:els of land were being sold and that it might be in the best
.·:erest of all to sell the IJarcels separately.
.,;~t,

At the very

r.e had a duty to ad'lise of t'.lat ;Jossibility.

It is clear
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was guilty of a breach of his fiduciary dut; to the Blodgetts.

POINT IV

THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTA2LISH THAT
THE TRUSTEE'S SALE WAS OF NO VALIDITY

The summary judgment alleges that the sale was
conducted in all manners required by law.

This is obviously ir

error as noted in the Statement of Facts above.
not given as required.

The notices

·.;e~'

The property was ambiguously described,.

the trust deed, making it impossible to determine what was be11c
sold, much less whether there were two parcels instead of one
being sold.
The description of the property as sent and posted by
Ashworth in the r.otice of sale is so inaccurate that any
potential buyer could not determine from the notice how big t:·,e
piece is.

Only two courses of a metes ar.d bounds description

were given in the notice.
If in fact there were two parcels to be sold,
respondent Ashworth did not make that declaration to the partieE
in attendance.

Further he did not advise any of the parties,

particularly the appellants, whether the

parce~s

could be sold;'

two separate parcels.
After the t:id ·.-as made on behalf of respondent

Marts:~

his agent could not meet the qualifications of the trustee's
notice, namely tha: the

mo~ey

~as

to be

pai~

l~

cas~

o~
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b·

Sc-·

: 35 ~1er's
, 3

c~eck

the day of sale.

Yet the trustee permitted the

;e to continue onto the next day in violation of the law on

:'Jstee's sales and of the notice of the sale itself.

Utah Code

)§57-1-25,-27.

> ..1.

POINT V

THE GROCERY STORE WAS NOT THE SUBJECT OF THE TRUST DEED.

There is not only sufficient evidence to allow this
""tter to go to trial on the question of the improper manner and
in which the sale was conducted, there is also sufficient

::rm

that the trust deed covered only the car wash property.

,.,·lC~ence

Court in a very recent case held that under the circum-

~his

:~31ces

presented by this case parol evidence can be introduced

:: ir.dicate the true construction of the deed.

Jensen v. :-lanila

:0ro. of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,
0

565

.2d 63 (Utah 1977).
It is clear from an analysis of the instant case in a

-~"ut

most favorable to the appellants that neither they nor the

:nk e'!er
:~e

intended the grocery store property to be included in

trust deed.

,~-,its)

Just as it was a mistake (as the bank now

for the bank to have required the 3lodgetts to sign as

:>signer.3 on the :-iote, so it was a mistake to have shown the
:::er~

store property on the trust deed in the form executed.

: ::3::,..:ssed

3bo·,~e,

':.'.'"'.e :::ar::< never jiscuss'3d :.he store property
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property.

It is w3s not

e~en

noted on any of

t~e

car wash

Those work papers discuss onl1

which is mJch less than the
wash property with

tan~'s

improve~ents

Deposition, page 19.

103~
t~e

c~·

own appraised value of

of $38,000.

(Throndson

Moreover, if additional security was

needed, it certainly did not involve the taking of a trust deed
on a piece of property with an equity in the 3lodgetts in exces5
of 5100,000.

The Blodgetts owned less valuable property which,

if it had been necessary and acceptable to the Blodgetts, could
have been used.

Further, the bank reconveyed the grocery store

property to the Blodgetts a few days after the sale, which act
contradicts the claim that the store property was sold at the
trustee's sale.
In start, there was no reason at all for the

responde~:

bank to have included the grocery store property in the trust
deed.

All evidence taken in a light favorable to appellants

shows that the bank did not intend to include the same.
The trust deed descrices a right of ingress and ejross
over the store property.

An interpretation of the trust deed

easily permits the construction that the description of the

grocery store property was oniy for the pcrpose of

identify1~;

the property over which the car wash property had rights of
Scth:~g

~ore.
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li1?:-ess anJ

By reason of the
.-,~e

su~mary

granted respondents,

judg~ent

has not been an opportJni:y to present

e~1dence

on these

The allegation that the grocery store property was not

-:;~':s.

:c;r: of that property to have been sold and that the State of
and Joe

~ah
.~;

~artsch

are constructive trustees of the property

in the complaint and fully supported by evidence sufficient
the lower court to have denied the summary

'.'·o

judg~ent.

That

lower court did not deny the summary judgment was in error

oc.o this Court should reverse the same 3nd remand the case for a

::1al on its merits.

POINT VI

THERE rs SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH
THAT

RES?O~DENT

MARTSCH WOULD BE UNJUSTLY ENRICHED

It is alleged in the pleadings, and there was no
::·.~r3cictory

evidence introd•Jced, that the grocery store

::);iert1 was ·11orth around $200, 000 at the time of the trustee
:o.:~.
''~

Shortly 3.fter the trustee's sale, the car wash property

s:ild to the State of Utah for $40,000.

As early as the bank

':;:r01isal in 1971 the car w3sh r:iroperty was appraised at $38,900.
>ro.1dse:: Ceposition,Sxhibit ?-12)
'.'.:~:.;,e's

Yet the amount bid in at the

S3le ·11as only $30,000.
::: the sale to the State of
resoo::~ent

~ar:s:h

~a~e

~tah

of the car wash

a profit of 3.bout Sl0,000.
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To

not only in light of tne

va:ue of the grocer; stare

tre~enjous

propert:,' but also i:i light of

'::i~e

relationship of !'artsch to ':

.c

Blodgetts.
This Court 'rias he:..d that a gross inadeq·Jacy of a

~ni

'c

may be sufficient in itself to note infirmities in the grantor'o
title (in this case, the trustee's title), Lawlev v.
Hickenloooer, 61 Utah 293,

212 P.526 (1922).

Moreover, such a

gross inadequacy of price paid in at the trustee's sale can be
sufficient to totally set aside the sale.

Pender v. Dowse,

1 Utah 2d 283, 265 P.2d 644 (1954); Crofoot v. Tarman,
147 Cal. App. 2d 43, 305 P.2d 56 (1957); Handy v. Rogers,
143 Colo. 1, 351 P.2d 819 (1960).
The lower court had more than ample evidence to

per~it

the case to go to trial on the merits because of the gross
inadequacy in price between the value of the property respondent
Martsch

clai~s

to have

acq~ired

at the trustee's sale and the

amount he paid for the same.
There is even a further basis
should be vacated.

~hy

the trustee's sale

The agent acting on behalf of respondent

Martsch was the very person who had every reason to know that

t' 0

trust deed should not have included the grocery store property.
She further was the very person by
note was brought about.

~horn

the default of the tr0s'.

The agency relationship

respondent Martsch and Betty Purcell

~artsch

lS

bet~een

more

t~a~
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"<':sc':i ..;as a director of '.':a.c'.J Car ;;ash.

The

~ncwledge

'.Jf Betty

Combining the gross inadequacy of the price paid at the
:~·Jstee

sale,

'·:~.owledge
1 :c,~':3ch,

E::le.

irregularities of the trustee sale, and the

of Betty Purcell Martsch imputed to respondent Joe
it is obvious that the trustee's sale should be set

The appellants have established many elements as a basis

'or recision of the sale, or in the alternative, a valid claim
':r :la;nages.

1

Hence the lower court improperly granted the

'c:i1rr.ary judgment.

POINT VI I

THE RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY OF FRAUD IN
THEIR DEALINGS WITH APPELLANTS
The respondents clai!ll that the grocery store property

.,s

i,-,cluded in the trustee's sale.

~-:lty

In this regard they are

of fra.ud towards t'.ie appella.nts.

;·d, as sr:own

Appellants have alleged

this brief, have established) a fiduciary

::lationship between the!ll and the respondents bank, Tenney, and
The cases have '.leld that under such circumstances,
<2~n
1

nc·,;

s~-;i'.:ts

to the :::espondents to show that there was no

-~~·~] =.r:d ':ha': t~ey acted iil qood faith.

37 Am.
e~i~e~ce

J•Jr.

2d,

in the light
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the

~..;

all of the

i ': '.1 reg 3 r J to res r: o:: .= ~ n t JG'=
e:e~ents

~-~arts

ch,

i t

i _; cl-?::

L.

,-

"·

of fraud, defined t1 this court in

Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1952), ha·Je

been~"'.

sufficiently to

i:t

the case tG go to trial.

per~it

acting through his agent

~ade

~ar~scr.

representations, both affirmative

and by not speaking ••hen obliged to do so, that ·;1ere false.

T·c

misrepresentations were to the effect that the only property
covered by the trust deed was the car wash property.
those misrepresentations, which continued throughout the course
of appellants

dealin~s

with respondent Martsch's agent,

constituted a

~ater1al

fact which was false according to the

present assertions af respondent that he is entitled to the
grocery store property.

It is obvious that had the Blodgetts

known the ;rocery store property was included in the trust deed,
they would have acted

~uch

differently than they did.

not have paid respondent bank $20,000 to retire the first trus:
deed on that property.
!.)roperty

They would not have permitted the

':o -:;o to sale and,

had

it sane t.J sale,

certainly bid in on the pro9erty.

+:.'r.ey ....,·ould r.~·:e

By making the false

representations ;1h1ch she did on teha:f cf respondent

~artsch,
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··r":.,·c'.' 3n ..J
- J: :

J. ,IU

:·.c;'.: t:1e

therefore ,;ere induced not to act,
•J 3 !713. :j

e,

In r<: Estate of Rose,

Goldsb''

·1.

Since a

Juricek,
,::iri~a

-"s;,:ior.dents ,'1artsch,
'c3Ud,

che courts have held

imposi':.ion of a co1s:ructi?e trust on t'le one i•wolv-:d.in the

'.:-3ud is ,::iroper.
~972);

Under such circumst3nces,

all to their

108 Ariz.

403 P.2d 454

(Okla.

493 P.2d 112

101,

1965).

facia case is establish-:d against

bank, Tenney, and Ashwor:h on the basis of

the lower court incorrectly granted the summary judgment

" to those four.

POINT VIII

THE STATE OF UTAH IS NOT A BONA FIDE
PURC~AS2R

FOR VALUE

At the time the Stat-: purchased the car wash property
::)n r'2spor.doent !·lartsch,

by its own action it made clear that it

·" 1ot acc<;>pt the trustee's sale as being c·::irr.plete.
conditions of the purchase,

··.,o

:~~t-Claim

Deed to respondent

As one of

it required Raco Car ;.;ash to give
~artsch.

(Affidavit of William
The State

-·' ?lor<;>nce Blodg'2tt, dated 1-lay 17, 1977, Exhibit 8)
0:sJ

"la:l a title search performed and therefore was aware of all

=~e

defects in the title by reason

.L

o(

~tsh

the

as

proble~s

~o

with the

the car

~ash
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ci:le, this cnurt

shou~d

like~ise

granted in favor of the State of

reverse the summary jud;ment
~tah

and

per~it

a trial on its

merits.

CONCLUSION

At the time the appellants entered into a lease
arrangement on the car

~ash

property, they agreed to sujordinate

the car wash property for the purposes of establishing a loan ••
the lessee.

They, however, had no idea nor any reasonable

expectation that any other property would be included. The bank
had had long dealings with appellants and they had every reason
to trust the bank.

~orecver

the bank held a position of

fiduciary responsibility to them because of that long
relationship and because of the truster/trustee relationship
establ~shed

by a previous trust deed.

A reading of the trust

~eed

docJment signed bv the

appellants can reasonabl; be interpreted to

~ean

that the

description of the grocery store property was included simpl; t:
establish the property over which the rights of ingress and
egress

~as

granted.

The

ban~,

through the respondent Tenney,
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!

,:,~c:

TJt to tenrinat2 the i:1t2r:est of R3co Car: ;:ash and Betty

:.-~ell
..

• 0

~artsch

anj that the bank

~ould

continue ':o help the

:13'.,ts on the property.
If,

~'~p"erty

as respondents now claim, the grocery store

was included in the trust deed and was so included

.1tentionally,

then the respondent bank had a duty to so advise

:1e :i.ppellants at the time of the signing of the trust deed.

The

,1:< had a duty again, as the note was in default and as the
:cJstee sale was nearing,

to advise the Blodgetts of all the

:nper:ty which was included.

Certainly as part of the friendly

:ooperation of the bank through respondent Tenney in advising the

: ::ocget:ts that the bank was willing to work with them on getting
":J of the lessee's interest,

the be.nk and Tenney made

iffirmative misrepresentations.

They not only misled the

::o:Jg9tts as to what the bank intended to do at the trustee sale,
:.: also lulled the Blodgetts into believing there was no danger
1

t:19 c:ix wash property.

::

To pour salt into the wound, they

::Jld ::itwiously tell the Blodgetts had no idea the grocery stoJ:"e
~:o;i>0r':y

was in any danger, yet said nothing.

:c1ed out for
0

The situation

the bank to affirmatively advise the Blodgetts of

i:n::iending peril.
If the grocery store property was not intentionally but

0
•

::q9nt:ly included in the trust deed,

: c;:.•:c.1sibi~i:y
0

for

The

da::-:ag~s

langu!~9

then the bank has a

to the Blodgetts because of its
=E

the trust deed is pooJ:"ly drawn and
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-2:-

the

ban~<.

The n0tice

sale.

·J~

s3l2

~as

de~e:tive

in its

The trustee did not advise the parties that two parcels

were involved or that the parcels could be sold separately.
is clear that
i~properly

t~e

:r~stee

It

acted not onl; negligently and

but also in violation of his fiduciary duty to the

appellants.
Joe Mar:sch bought in at the sale through his agent

,,~;

had a great deal of knowledge about the whole transaction and
t~erefore

knew or should have known that only the car wash

property was to be sold.

"loreo11er, the agent of Joe >1artsch i1d

been working actively with the State of Utah prior to the sale
order to arranqe a purchase of the car wash property.

She haJ

facts to warrant the belief that the sale of the car wash
property :a :he State would bring around $10,GOO
Ta make a

clai~

now

~ore

t~at

the

than the
groc~ry

store property was also included in the sale, contrary to the
le3.3~

doc•J;r,ents,

contrary

to

t:-.e ~r.Ce:-standin·j

~JE

the 3lodgetts,

and contrary to good conscience, would be compounding the evil
done

~he~

behalf of

~rs.

3~tty

r2s~o~d2n~

?ursell

~a~tsc~

w3s

ev~~

all~wed

~ar~sch.
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to biJ

:~

The lower court
li;~t
:~::-~)t::t
-, 0

t

~ost

before i : ;nan; facts which, tak2n

favorable to the 3??ellants, :nore than

a jud9:r,ent

r~·Jie·..;

~ad

Eor

t:;e a?pellant3.

ade~~ately

That the lower court did
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